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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Aristeo Gomez appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the 
jury verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct with a child under the age of 
sixteen. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Gomez was charged with lewd conduct with a child under the age of 
sixteen, against V.B., the fifteen-year-old daughter of a woman with whom he 
lived and with whom he had four additional children. (R., pp.34-35; Trial Tr., 
p.48, L.4 - p.51, L.4.) The state provided notice of its intent to introduce 
evidence at trial of Gomez's prior bad acts, in the form of testimony by V. B. 's 
sisters and a friend regarding his sexual conduct with them. (Augmentation, 
Notice of State's Intent to Introduce Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 
Pursuant to IRE 404(b), dated 3/23/06 and 9/28/06.) Gomez objected to the 
admission of this evidence. (Augmentation, Objection to Intent to Introduce 
Evidence Pursuant to LR.E. 404(b) and Motion in Limine to Exclude 404(b) 
Evidence, dated 9/28/06.) 
At a hearing on Gomez's motion to exclude the evidence, Gomez did not 
dispute that the prior bad acts had occurred, only that they had any relevance to 
the instant proceeding and that they were unduly prejudicial. The district court 
denied the motion but required the: k'fate to make an offer of proof outside the 
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presence of the jury before mentioning the testimony in its opening statement or 
presenting the testimony.1 (10/6/06 Tr., p.31, L.14 - p.32, L.5.) 
V.B. testified that, at the time of the charged conduct, she lived in 
Gomez's house, along with her two older brothers and all of her half-siblings. 
(Trial Tr., p.48, L.4 - p.51, L.4, p.53, L.16 - p.54, L.17.) She shared a room and 
a bed with her brother Franky, who worked nights. (Trial Tr., p.63, Ls.1-10, .) 
Early one morning, after Franky returned home and was asleep in the bed with 
! ,i:' ':;-';',::.(.; 
her, V.B. awoke to find Gomez touching her, over her clothes, on her breasts, 
buttocks and vagina. (Trial Tr., p.63, L.1 - p.66, L.11.) When V.B. told him to 
stop, Gomez offered V.B. $100 to sleep with him. (Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.14-19, p.69, 
Ls.10-19.) V.B. told him "no, just get out of my room." (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.15-
17.) After he left, V.B. locked her door and went back to sleep. (Trial Tr., p.68, 
Ls.9-15.) V.B. was embarrassed by what happened and didn't tell anyone in her 
family about it. (Trial Tr., p.70, L.15 - p.71, L.7.) When she later told her 
boyfriend about it, he told her brothers, who later called the police. (Trial Tr., 
p.72, Ls.7-14, p.75, Ls.3-18, p.76, Ls.4-11.) 
.t· 
1 The offer of proof was apparently unrecorded and is therefore not a part of the 
record on appeal. The state, however, mentioned the testimony in its opening 
statement without objection from Gomez (Trial Tr., p.40, Ls.18-25), and 
presented the testimony with the only objection from Gomez being a general 
continuing objection to the testimony (Trial Tr., p.133, Ls.12-17), leading to the 
conclusion that an offer of proof must have been made off the record or that the 
lack of one was not objected to by Gomez below. 
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V.B. also testified that Gomez had touched her on earlier occasions when 
she was sleeping, had come into the. qathroom while she was showering, had 
exposed himself to her, and had "teased" her that her vagina was hairy. (Trial 
Tr., p.80, Ls.7-13, p.85, Ls.21-25, p.86, L.22 - p.87, L.4, p.89, Ls.9-14, 90, Ls.3-
6, p.90, Ls.15-25, p.91, Ls.16-24, p.92, Ls.18-24, p.94, Ls.3-19.) Gomez told 
V.B. that her mom would never believe her if she told her about him touching 
her. (Trial Tr., p.71, L.20 - p.72, L.1.) 
V.B.'s older sister, E.B., testified that when she was about 12 years old, 
Gomez offered her money to sleep with him. (Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.11-13, p.135, 
Ls.10-24, p.136, L.24 - p.137, L.3.) E.B. also testified that on another occasion, 
she was sleeping in a bed with her sisters and brothers, and she woke up to find 
Gomez next to her in the bed; riake(r~t6uching her breasts. (Trial Tr., p.137, 
L.11 - p.138, L.24.) When she woke up, she told him "what are you doing here? 
Get out of my bed," and Gomez left the room. (Trial Tr., p.137, Ls.21-23.) She 
testified that on several other occasions, she woke up to find Gomez touching 
her breasts or vagina, both under and over her clothes. (Trial Tr., p.140, L.189 -
p.141, L.8, p.142, Ls.13-22, p.143, L1 - p.144, L.12.) When E.B. woke up and 
told him to get out, he left the room. (Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.4-12, p.225, Ls.1-24.) 
E.B. began trying to sleep in the middle of the bed, in between her brothers and 
sisters, so that Gomez could not get to her without waking someone up. (Trial 
Tr., p.225, Ls.4-11.) E.B. teshfi'ed that the nighttime touching incidents 
'. \' \."~\'.\.?- ::,i " 
happened until she left the house when she was 18. (Trial Tr., p.137, Ls.4-10.) 
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E.B. also testified that Gomez came into the bathroom while she was showering 
and opened the curtain to stare at her. (Trial Tr., p.223, Ls.11-23.) 
V.B.'s other older sister, M.B., who is two years younger than E.B., also 
testified. (Trial Tr., p.129, Ls.13-14, p.252, Ls.4-B.) M.B. testified that when she 
was sleeping in a bed with one of her siblings, she woke up to find Gomez, who 
had unzipped her pants and pulledt~,e .front of her underwear down, was sitting 
on the bed and touching her. (Trial Tr., p.265, L.23 - p.267, L.20.) When she 
woke up and told him to leave her alone, he wanted to know where her sister, 
E.B. had gone. (Trial Tr., p.267, Ls.13-24.) M.B. also testified that Gomez 
watched her while she took a bath (Trial Tr., p.263, Ls.1-15), grabbed her 
breasts from behind (Trial Tr., p.260, Ls.1B-25), had asked her to marry him and 
that he "wouldn't stop doing sex" with her (Trial Tr., p.264, Ls.14-1B), and offered 
to buy her clothes and a car if she would sleep with him (Trial Tr., p.265, Ls.5-7). 
M.B. testified that the incidents stopped when she left home when she was 
sixteen. (Trial Tr., p.272, Ls.10-15.) 
S.B., V.B.'s younger sist~r whio'was 16 at the time of trial, testified that on 
one occasion when she was 12 years old, she was asleep in a bed in her mom's 
room and woke to find Gomez touching her. (Trial Tr., p.303, L.21 - p.305, L.3, 
p.307, Ls.1-2.) Gomez had pulled down his pants and S.B.'s pants, with his 
penis touching her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.304, Ls.1B-20, p.305, L.11 - p.306, L.B.) 
S.B. believed he was about to rape her and started crying, to which Gomez 
responded "Come on. I'll give you $2." (Trial Tr., p.304, Ls.1B-21.) When S.B. 
refused and kept crying, he got up and left. (Trial Tr., p.304, Ls.22-24.) S.B. also 
4 
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testified that she woke up on other occasions to find Gomez touching her vagina. 
" , 
,,:.','" . ' 
(Trial Tr., p.307, L.16 - p.308, L.9.) S.B. also testified that Gomez came into the 
bathroom while she was showering and tried to touch her but stopped when her 
little sister came in the bathroom. (Trial Tr., p.310, Ls.11-23.) S.B. also testified 
that on another occasion Gomez grabbed her and touched her vagina, over her 
pants. (Trial Tr., p.300, L.24 - p.301, L.20.) 
V.B.'s youngest full sister, M.L.B., who was 14 at the time of trial, testified 
that on one occasion when she was asleep on a bed in her mom's room, she 
woke up to find her pants and bra undone and Gomez touching her "between her 
legs" and on her breast. (Trial Tr., p.351, L.18 - p.352, L.17.) M.L.B. also 
testified that when she was 11 yea·'rs,ol~,. Gomez grabbed her breasts and tried 
" : 1 
, ' 
to touch her "between her legs" (Trial Tr., p.341, L.2 - p.343, L.16), offered her 
money to "go in the room" with him (Trial Tr., p.346, L.19 - p.347, L.21) and 
came into the bathroom and looked at her while she was taking a shower (Trial 
Tr., p.370, Ls.4-18). 
V.B.'s friend, C.G., testified that one night when she was in eighth grade, 
she spent the night at V.B.'s house, and was asleep in a bed with V.B. when she 
woke up to find Gomez touching her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.376, L.17 - p.377, L.14, 
p.379, L.22 - p.380, L.5.) 
Before the testimony offered by E.B., S.B., and C.G., the judge gave a 
limiting instruction to the jury; ins:tfdbting them that the testimony by the 
witnesses other than V.B. was not to be considered as evidence that Gomez had 
a propensity to commit these crimes, but was instead to only be considered to 
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determine his motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity 
or absence or mistake or accident with regard to the incident involving V.B. only. 
(Trial Tr., p.133, L.23 - p.134, L.4, p.295, L.23 - p.296, L.4, p.371, L.22 - p.372, 
L.7.) The judge also gave the limiting instruction shortly after M.B. began to 
testify (Trial Tr., p.258, L.16 - p.259, L.11), and just before cross-examination of 
'. ,r, 
M.L.B. (Trial Tr., p.358, Ls.5-14). '.'n-, 'f:':1 
The jury found Gomez guilty of lewd conduct with a child under the age of 
sixteen. (R., p.191.) The district court entered judgment and imposed a unified 
sentence of twenty years with ten years fixed. (R., pp.224-227.) Gomez timely 
appealed. (R., pp.229-231.) 
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ISSUE 
Gomez states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err by admitting highly prejudicial Rule 404(b) 
evidence that was not relevant to any issue other than propensity? 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue as: 
Has Gomez failed to show that the district court erred in admitting prior bad acts 
evidence against him? 
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ARGUMENT 
Gomez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Admitted 
Evidence Of Gomez's Sexual Abuse Of The Victim's Sisters And Friend 
A. Introduction 
The district court allowed the state to present testimony by V.B.'s sisters 
and a friend that they had each experienced similar sexual assaults by Gomez 
while in his home. Specifically, that each of them had awoken to find him 
touching them, and that the sisters had been offered money, clothes or a car for 
sex, had been watched by Gomez while in the shower, and had been grabbed by 
him when only his young children were present. Review of the record and 
application of relevant law shows that Gomez has failed to show an abuse of 
discretion in the admission of this testimony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b), are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible: f()r a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
.'.>' 8 
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C. Gomez Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Admission Of The Evidence 
Of Gomez's Sexual Abuse Of The Victim's Sisters And Friends Was 
Prejudicial Error 
Evidenc~ of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of the defendant in an attempt to show he or she committed the crime 
for which he or she is on trial. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 
1188 (2009). However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, 
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. LR.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 
Idaho 178,845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83,87,785 P.2d 
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is 
relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its 
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the 
probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 
227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,275-76,77 P.3d 956,964-65 (2003). 
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Gomez, relying primarily on State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185 
(2009), contends that the evidence was relevant only to show character because 
the only similarities of the prior event and the current event were similarities of 
age and circumstances of the victims, grounds found insufficient for admission of 
evidence in Grist. (Appellant's br:ief,:: pp.13-19.2) A closer review of Grist, 
however, shows that it does not forbid the admission of the testimony of. 
Gomez's other victims. 
2 Gomez also argues that the district court failed to find that the state established 
the prior bad acts occurred or that he committed them. (Appellant's brief, p.13.) 
As previously noted, the district court required the state to make an offer of proof 
before mentioning the testimony in its opening or introducing it at trial. To the 
extent that the offer of proof was held off the record, there is no record for this 
Court to review to determine whether the district court did or did not require the 
state to establish the acts occurreq and that Gomez committed them. In light of 
the fact, however, that Gomez did not object to the state mentioning the 
testimony in its opening and only copti!lued its earlier objection that the evidence 
was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, this Court can reasonably conclude that 
the district court considered an offer of proof and determined that the threshold 
finding had been met. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538,541,835 P.2d 1349, 1352 
(Ct. App. 1992) (missing portions of the record are presumed to support the 
actions of the court below). This Court can then look to the record and 
determine whether such a finding was supported by substantial and competent 
evidence: "We will treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act 
has been established by sufficient evidence as we do all factual findings by a trial 
court. We defer to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence in the record." State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 214, 207 
P .3d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Gomez also argues that the district court "abuse[d] its discretion" by "appl[ying] 
the wrong legal standard" to its relevancy determination, particularly as set forth 
in Grist. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) The state notes that the district court could 
not have applied the analysis of Grist because that case had not yet been 
decided. In addition, the argument is irrelevant because the question of 
relevance is reviewed de novo,not for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 
Idaho 49,51,205 P.3d 1185, 11 87 .(~P.H~). 
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The Court in Grist discussed admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) to 
corroborate a victim and to show a common scheme or plan. It did not state that 
evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible for this purpose, but emphasized that if 
the only relevance of the evidence was that it tended to show that because the 
defendant did it before he probably did it again it was not properly considered 
evidence of either corroboration or a common scheme or plan. Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190 ("The unstated premise in Moore is simply this: 'If he did 
it before, he probably did it this tim~,;as welL' This complete reliance upon 
propensity is not a permissible basis for the admission of evidence of uncharged 
misconduct.") The Court went on, however, to point out that prior bad act 
evidence can be admissible to corroborate or show a common plan or scheme. 
& at 54-55, 205 P.3d at 1190-91. The Court cautioned that district courts 
should scrutinize whether evidence offered to show corroboration or common 
scheme or plan "actually serves the articulated purpose or whether such 
evidence is merely propensity evidence served up under a different name." & at 
55, 205 P.3d at 1191. In so cautioning, the Court nonetheless endorsed as 
correct its statement in State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743,746,819 P.2d 1143, 
1146 (1991): "[w]here relevant to it~~ c'redibility of the parties, evidence of a 
common criminal design is admissible." Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 
1190. 
In State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 227 P.3d 918 (2010), the Court 
further made clear that "at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common 
scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with 
11 
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',,, ' 
children in the past." Johnson, 148 Idaho at _, 227 P.3d at 922. Instead, 
"[t]he events must be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely 
showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that 
I .,t.\ '1 
the same person committed all the acts." kL, citing State v. Cardell, 132 Idaho 
217, 220, 970 P.2d 10, 13 (1998) (admitting evidence that defendant, a 
masseuse, had previously assaulted his clients while massaging them to show 
that he did not accidentally grope the victim during a massage). 
Here the evidence is admissible for purposes other than mere propensity. 
As in Cardell, the evidence was admissible to show that Gomez did not 
mistakenly touch V.B.'s vagina, breast and buttocks while she was sleeping. 
The events testified to by V.B. and her sisters and friends are linked by common 
characteristics that go beyond mere propensity. They establish evidence of a 
common criminal design. They esta'blish a pattern of intentional behavior, one in 
, ",1 , 
which Gomez would enter the bedroom in which his girlfriend's adolescent 
daughters were sleeping, to take advantage of their sleep state in order to 
sexually assault them. Indeed, when M.B. woke up while Gomez was assaulting 
her, he demanded to know where E.B. was, clearly expecting to find her in the 
bed. Likewise, the testimony regarding Gomez's acts of offering money or 
clothes to the sisters in exchange for sex, entering the bathroom while they were 
showering and grabbing them when their mom wasn't around is consistent and 
establishes Gomez's intent to victimize his girlfriend's daughters. The evidence 
of the prior, similar assaults shows the absence of mistake or accident - and in 
, . .,;':;,\,: 
the incident involving M. B., gives rise' to'the conclusion that the only "mistake" by 
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Gomez that night might have been as to which sister he meant to violate. In 
short, the evidence is relevant for far more than merely to show that Gomez 
likely committed the charged acts because he had committed similar acts before. 
D. The Probative Value Of The Evidence Is Not Substantially Outweighed By 
Its Potential For Prejudice 
The highly probative value of the evidence shows that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion. As showl): a.bove, the evidence was very probative for 
, ',\,! I,t 'I. 
explaining Gomez's conduct, and eliminating the possibility that Gomez acted by 
mistake or accident. Although the evidence does show bad character, Gomez 
has failed to show a real likelihood that the jury would disregard the evidence of 
guilt and convict on the basis of bad character. He has therefore failed to show 
an abuse of discretion. 
Finally, the district court did instruct the jury on the proper uses of the prior 
bad acts evidence. (Trial Tr., p.133, L.23 - p.134, L.4, p.258, L.16 - p.259, L.11, 
p.295, L.23 - p.296, L.4, p.358, Ls.5-14, p.371, L.22 - p.372, L.7.) The risk of 
unfair prejudice relating to the admission of uncharged misconduct was reduced 
by "the trial court's instruction tha't th~\'1dr'ors were not to consider the uncharged 
acts as proof that [Gomez] had criminal propensities or behaved in conformity 
with them by committing the charged crimes." State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 
591, 38 P.3d 625, 629 (Ct. App. 2001). In short, the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in concluding that a jury, properly instructed on the proper use of 
the evidence, would be able to fairly judge Gomez on the facts and evidence 
presented instead of convict on the basis of prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully asks th'j'~:dourt to affirm the judgment of conviction 
entered upon the jury's verdict finding Gomez guilty of lewd conduct with a minor 
child under the age of sixteen. 
DATED this 28th day of May, 2010. 
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